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The purpose of this study is to obtain empirical evidence about the effects of 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership on financial distress and 
examine the role of the audit committee in moderating the effect of managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership on financial distress. The sampling 
technique used is the nonprobability sampling method with a purposive 
sampling technique. The data used in this study are secondary data obtained 
from the financial statements of manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2014-2018 period. Data are analyzed using 
ordinal logistic regression. The results of the analysis show that managerial 
ownership has no effect on financial distress, institutional ownership has a 
negative effect on financial distress, and the audit committee does not 
moderate the relationship between either managerial ownership or institutional 
ownership on financial distress. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Financial distress is the stage of decline in financial conditions experienced by a company before bankruptcy (Platt & 
Platt, 2002). Financial distress caused by the company due to cash flow difficulties, the amount of debt, and losses due 
to operations (Harmawan, 2013). During the period 2014-2018, there were 24 manufacturing companies that published 
financial statements on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) which suffered losses for 3 consecutive years. Of these 
24 companies, 6 of them experienced an increase in debt from 2014-2018 and 10 companies had a negative operating 
cash flow value for 3 years. 
Poor implementation of corporate governance principles is one of the causes of the collapse of big companies in 
the world (Sutojo & Aldridge, 2008). Corporate governance is a system used to direct and control the company's 
business activities (Sutojo & Aldridge, 2008). The ownership structure is one of the internal factors of a company that 
influences the application of corporate governance principles (Sutojo & Aldridge, 2008). The ownership structure in a 
company will play an important role in determining the success or failure of a company (Udin et al., 2017). The 
ownership structure used in this study is managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Managerial ownership is 
ownership of shares by company managers including ownership by the board of directors and commissioners. While 
institutional ownership is the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors, such as insurance companies, 
investment companies, and banks (Moradi et al., 2012). The greater managerial ownership and institutional ownership 
in a company will have an impact on the more efficient use of company assets so that the potential for financial distress 
can be minimized. 
Agency theory is the basis for the implementation of corporate governance as a mechanism of supervision and 
control (Harahap, 2017). The audit committee is a corporate governance mechanism used to control and oversee 
company management (Rahmawati, 2016; Putri & Sujana, 2018). The audit committee functions to carry out internal 
control related to accounting policies, risk management, compliance with applicable legal provisions, and compliance 
with the company's articles of association and bylaws, as well as the process of disclosure of the company's financial 
statements (Sutojo & Aldridge, 2008). The number of members of the audit committee has a close relationship with 
how much resources are allocated to deal with the problems facing the company. Increasing the number of audit 
committees in a company will facilitate the audit committee in exchanging ideas to solve problems faced by the 
company so that the company can avoid conditions of financial distress. 
Several factors that have been investigated by previous studies in explaining the phenomenon of financial distress 
are managerial ownership (Affiah & Muslih, 2018; Luqman  et al., 2018; Zahra et al., 2018) institutional ownership 
(Filsaraei & Moghaddam (2016); Chrissentia & Syarief, 2018; Septiani & Dana, 2019), proportion of independent 
commissioners (Yudha & Fuad, 2014; Fathonah, 2016; Pramudena, 2017), number board of directors (Hanafi & 
Breliastiti, 2016; Baklouti et al., 2016; Harahap, 2017), profitability (Carolina et al., 2017; Kalimah, 2017; Masdupi 
et al., 2018), liquidity (Khaliq et al., 2014; Sari & Putri, 2016; Waqas & Md-Rus, 2018), leverage (Ufo, 2015; Ong'era 
et al., 2017; Agustini & Wirawati, 2019), operating capacity (Yayanti & Yanti, 2016; Rahmawati, 2016; Ratna & 
Marwati, 2018), and company size (Putri & Merkusiwati, 2014; Filsaraei & Moghaddam (2016); Rahmawati & 
Handriyana, 2018; Dewi & Ramantha, 2019). The profitability, liquidity, leverage, and operating capacity variables 
cannot be used in this study because the Altman model used to measure financial distress already includes these ratios. 
The variable proportion of the independent board of commissioners in most studies showed a negative effect on 
financial distress. The company size variable in most studies showed has no effect on financial distress. Managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership variables in several studies still show inconsistent results. The inconsistency of 
the results of the study caused the researcher to conduct further research by adding audit committee variables as 
moderating variables. The reason the researcher uses the audit committee variable is that this research focuses on 
agency theory that explains the associated conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. This conflict of 
interest causes shareholders to be willing to pay a monitoring fee to ensure that managers act in the interests of 
shareholders. An audit committee is a form of supervision costs incurred by shareholders. 
 
Literature review and hypothesis development 
Agency theory 
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), describe agency relationships as contracts where one or more people (principals) involve 
another person (agent) to perform some services on behalf of the principal which involves the delegation of some 
decision making authority to the agent. Eisenhardt (1989), states that there are three assumptions of human nature, 
namely humans have selfishness, humans have limited thinking power about future perceptions, and humans always 
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avoid risk. Selfish human nature will lead to the emergence of opportunistic behavior from every parties in the 
company. Managers will utilize the information asymmetry they have to be able to create maximum profits for 
themselves. Information asymmetry occurs when managers as internal parties have more information than shareholders 
as external parties (Fadhilah & Syafruddin, 2013). The existence of information asymmetry causes shareholders to be 
willing to pay a monitoring fee called the agency cost (Yudiana & Yadnyana, 2016). One way to minimize agency 
costs incurred by a company is by increasing share ownership by managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and institutions 
(Bodroastuti, 2009).  
 
Stewardship theory 
 
Stewardship theory emphasizes organizational management in creating harmony between shareholders and managers 
in achieving common goals (Anton, 2010). Managers as stewards will try to work together when there are differences 
in interests between principal and stewards. The manager will act in accordance with the interests of shareholders for 
the realization of company goals (Raharjo, 2007). Stewardship theory in this study is used to explain the effect of 
managerial ownership on financial distress. Share ownership by management will create a sense of ownership within 
the manager so that the manager's orientation does not only focus on the bonus that will be received at this time, but 
will be more focused on improving the company's long-term performance in order to achieve the planned objectives. 
 
Alignment effect theory 
 
Fan & Wong (2002), define the effect of alignment as the actions of controlling shareholders that are aligned with the 
interests of non-controlling shareholders. Greater cash flow rights are a commitment to controlling shareholders to 
limit expropriation (Porta et al., 1999). Ownership of cash flow by the controlling shareholder can reduce his desire to 
expropriate and increase his desire to pay cash dividends (Sanjaya, 2010). The alignment effect theory in this study is 
used to explain the effect of institutional ownership on financial distress. Institutions as parties who invest shares in 
companies certainly hope to get dividends from their investments. 
 
Effect of managerial ownership on financial distress 
 
Agency conflict that occurs in a company is caused because shareholders and managers have a conflict of interests to 
maximize their respective utility. Managerial ownership is a way that can be used to unify the choices of managers 
with the interests of shareholders. Managerial ownership will create a sense of ownership in managers. Managerial 
ownership will cause managers to be more oriented towards the long-term performance of the company than the bonus 
that will be received at this time. Increasing the percentage of managerial ownership will be able to minimize the 
potential for financial distress experienced by the company. Research conducted by Pramudena (2017); Affiah & 
Muslih (2018); Luqman et al. (2018); and Zahra et al. (2018), states that managerial ownership has a negative effect 
on financial distress. Based on these reasons, the hypothesis that can be developed in this study is. 
H1: Managerial ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. 
 
Effect of institutional ownership on financial distress 
 
Agency theory is the basis for the implementation of corporate governance as a mechanism of supervision and control 
(Harahap, 2017). Institutional ownership is one form of oversight and control mechanism for managers' opportunistic 
behavior. A large proportion of institutional ownership can help the monitoring process so it can effectively control 
the manager's performance. The greater institutional ownership will have an impact on the more efficient use of 
company assets so that the potential for financial distress can be minimized. Research conducted by Filsaraei & 
Moghaddam (2016); Chrissentia & Syarief (2018); Luqman et al. (2018); and Septiani & Dana (2019), states that the 
institutional ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. Based on these reasons, the hypothesis that can be 
developed in this study is. 
H2: Institutional ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. 
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The Role of the Audit Committee in Moderating the Effect of Managerial Ownership on Financial Distress 
 
Managerial ownership will cause managers to tend to engage in value creation activities that can increase the company's 
long-term competitive advantage (Saleh et al., 2009). Stewardship theory states that managers as stewards will behave 
according to common interests in an effort to achieve organizational goals. However, the task of achieving the goals 
of the organization is not only the responsibility of the manager but also all elements of the company. Managers as 
those who carry out the planning and decision making will certainly need help from other parties to control and 
supervise the activities of the company. The audit committee is a corporate governance mechanism that has functions 
to carry out internal control related to company activities. Based on these reasons, the hypothesis that can be developed 
in this study is. 
H3: The audit committee reinforces the negative effect of managerial ownership on financial distress. 
 
The Role of the Audit Committee in Moderating the Effects of Institutional Ownership on Financial Distress 
 
Corporate governance is a mechanism used to balance the actions and choices of managers with the interests of 
shareholders (Susanti, 2011). Institutional ownership is one part of the corporate governance mechanism. The 
percentage of share ownership by an institution in a company tends to be large, thereby causing the institution to have 
the right to participate in overseeing and controlling the activities of the company. However, institutional ownership 
is ownership of shares by outsiders. The position of institutions outside the company causes them to not be able to 
know the problems facing the company in detail and on time. The audit committee is another corporate governance 
mechanism within a company that is responsible for overseeing financial reporting, risk management, and control, as 
well as corporate governance of a company (Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 2002). Based on these reasons, 
the hypothesis that can be developed in this study is. 
H4: The audit committee reinforces the negative effect of institutional ownership on financial distress.  
 
 
2   Materials and Methods 
 
This research was conducted on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2014-
2018, with a total of 746 companies. The sample in this study was determined using a purposive sampling technique. 
The sample criteria that will be used in this study are (1) manufacturing companies that publish annual financial reports 
in 2014-2018 and (2) manufacturing companies that have managerial ownership and institutional ownership in 2014-
2018. Based on these criteria, the number of samples used in this study was 358 companies. 
Financial distress is measured using the model Altman (2013), with the equation formula is: 
Z-score = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.99X5 ............................................................................................  (1) 
 
Information: 
X1 = working capital / total assets 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets 
X3 = earnings before interest and tax / total assets 
X4 = market value of equity / book value of debt 
X5 = sales / total assets 
 
The scales used in classification are as follows: 
Z-score < 1.81  = financial distress 
1.81 ≤ Z-score ≤ 2.99 = zone of ignorance or gray area 
Z-score > 2.99   = non-financial distress 
 
Managerial ownership is measured by total shares owned by management divide total shares outstanding. Institutional 
ownership is measured by total shares owned by the institution divide total shares outstanding. The audit committee in 
this study was measured using total members of the audit committee owned by the company. 
The data analysis technique used in this study is the ordinal logistic regression analysis. The use of ordinal logistic 
regression because the dependent variable has more than two categories and consists of an ordinal scale (ranking). 
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Companies that fall into the financial distress category are given symbol 3, gray area is given symbol 2, and non-
financial distress is given symbol 1. 
 
 
3   Results and Discussions 
 
The sample used in this study were 358 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-
2018. Of these, 120 companies were found in financial distress, 65 companies in the gray area, and 173 companies in 
non-financial distress. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics provide information about the characteristics of the research variables consisting of the number 
of observations, minimum values, maximum values, mean values, and standard deviations. Table 1 shows the results 
of the descriptive statistics. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Samples Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Financial Distress 358 1.00000 3.00000 1.85000 0.94000 
Managerial Ownership 358 0.00001 0.79280 0.07762 0.13298 
Institutional Ownership 358 0.00900 0.98950 0.65117 0.20336 
Audit Committee 358 2.00000 6.00000 3.09000 0.42600 
 
Table 1 shows the mean value of financial difficulties is 1.85000. This value indicates that in general, the company 
under study is in a non-financial distress condition. The mean value of managerial ownership of 0.07762 means that 
the average total shares owned by the board of commissioners and directors in a company are 7.762 percent of the total 
shares outstanding. The mean value of institutional ownership of 0.65117 means that the average total shares owned 
by institutional investors such as insurance companies, investment companies, and banks in a company are 65.117 
percent of the total shares outstanding. The mean value of the audit committee of 3.09000 means that the average 
number of audit committees is 3 members.  
 
Hypothesis testing 
 
Table 2 shows the results of ordinal logistic regression testing with a significance of 5%. 
 
Table 2 
Regression logistic ordinal test result 
 
Information -2 Log Likelihood Significance 
Model Fitting 
Information 
Intercept only 722.807 - 
Final 710.723 0.034 
 
Information Beta Coefficient Significance 
Constant FD = 1 -3.253 0.030 
FD = 2 -2.480 0.097 
Managerial Ownership (X1) 11.705 0.240 
Institutional Ownership (X2) -2.419 0.024 
Audit Committee (X3) -1.095 0.299 
Managerial Ownership*Audit Committee (X1X3) -11.045 0.219 
Institutional Ownership*Audit Committee (X2X3) 0.441 0.147 
Test of Parallel Lines 0.276 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0.038 
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The fitting information model shows a decrease of -2 log likelihoods from 722.807 to 710.723 and this decrease is 
significant at 0.034. This shows that the model made is fit. The results of the test of parallel lines show a significance 
value of 0.276. This shows that the model created is suitable. The coefficient of determination (Nagelkerke R-Square) 
of 0.038 means that the variation of financial distress that can be explained by variations in managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, audit committee, interaction between managerial ownership and audit committee, and 
interaction between institutional ownership and audit committee is 3.8 percent, while the other 96.2 percent is 
influenced by other factors outside the research model. 
 
Based on Table 2, two regression equations can be formed as follows: 
Logit (p1)  = -3.253 + 11.705X1 – 2.419X2 – 1.095X3 – 11.045X1X3 + 0.441X2X3 .....................................................  (2) 
Logit (p1 + p2)  = -2.480 + 11.705X1 – 2.419X2 – 1.095X3 – 11.045X1X3 + 0.441X2X3 .....................................................  (3) 
 
Table 2 shows that managerial ownership, the interaction between managerial ownership and audit committee, and 
interaction between institutional ownership and audit committee have a significance value greater than 0.05. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that managerial ownership has no effect on financial distress, the audit committee does not 
moderate the effect of managerial ownership on financial distress, and the audit committee does not moderate the effect 
of institutional ownership on financial distress. Institutional ownership has a significance value of less than 0.05 with 
a negative coefficient beta value. This shows that institutional ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. 
 
3.1 Effect of managerial ownership on financial distress 
 
The result of the analysis shows that managerial ownership has no effect on financial distress. The results of this study 
reject hypothesis 1 (H1) which states managerial ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. The results of 
this study do not support the results of research conducted by Pramudena (2017); Affiah & Muslih (2018); Luqman et 
al. (2018); and Zahra et al. (2018), which states that managerial ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. 
However, the results of this study support research conducted by Cinantya & Merkusiwati (2015); Fathonah (2016); 
and Harahap (2017), which state that managerial ownership has no effect on financial distress. Managerial ownership 
has no effect on financial distress probably because the percentage of share ownership by management in the company 
is relatively small. The results of the descriptive statistical analysis show that the average number of shares owned by 
management is 7.762 percent of the total shares outstanding. Another factor that might also cause managerial 
ownership has no effect on financial distress is the unequal proportion of share ownership by management in the 
company. The percentage of the board of directors and commissioners who own shares is only 28.552 percent of the 
total management of the company.  
 
3.2 Effect of institutional ownership on financial distress 
 
The result of the analysis shows that institutional ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. The results of 
this study support hypothesis 2 (H2) which states that institutional ownership has a negative effect on financial distress. 
Increasing the percentage of share ownership by institutional investors such as insurance companies, investment 
companies, and banks in a company will cause the financial distress experienced by companies to decline. The results 
of this study reinforce the results of research conducted by Filsaraei & Moghaddam (2016); Chrissentia & Syarief 
(2018); Luqman et al. (2018); and Septiani & Dana (2019), which state that institutional ownership has a negative 
effect on financial distress. 
 
3.3 The role of the audit committee in moderating the effect of managerial ownership on financial distress 
 
The result of the analysis shows that the audit committee does not moderate the effect of managerial ownership on 
financial distress. Therefore, hypothesis 3 (H3) which states that the audit committee reinforces the negative effect of 
managerial ownership on financial distress is rejected. A small proportion of share ownership by management results 
in company management not having sufficiently strong voting rights to make decisions relating to the company. The 
small voting rights cause the management of the company before making important decisions that need to get the 
approval of the controlling shareholder. This will cause the company's management to not be able to quickly respond 
to the findings and recommendations submitted by the audit committee. 
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3.4 The role of the audit committee in moderating the effects of institutional ownership on financial distress 
 
The result of the analysis shows that the audit committee does not moderate the effect of institutional ownership on 
financial distress. Therefore, hypothesis 4 (H4) which states the audit committee reinforces the negative effect of 
institutional ownership on financial distress is rejected. The audit committee, in general, has a direct working 
relationship with internal auditors, external auditors, and management (Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 
2002). The audit committee does not have direct access to provide confidence to institutional investors regarding the 
financial statements presented by management. In addition, the analytical skills possessed by institutional investors 
will also make institutional investors not immediately feel confident about the results of supervision conducted by the 
company's audit committee, because institutional investors trust the results of their own analysis. 
 
 
4   Conclusion 
 
Based on the results of the analysis it can be concluded that (1) managerial ownership has no effect on financial distress, 
(2) institutional ownership has a negative effect on financial distress, (3) the audit committee does not moderate the 
relationship of managerial ownership on financial distress, and (4) the audit committee does not moderate the 
relationship of institutional ownership on financial distress. 
Based on the results of the analysis there are several suggestions that can be submitted for further researchers. First, 
this study only uses manufacturing companies as the scope of research. This is because the Altman Z-Score model has 
various types of variants, whose use is categorized based on the type of company studied. Therefore, if further research 
wants to generalize to all companies listed on the IDX, it is recommended to use other measurement methods such as 
Earning Per Share (EPS). Second, the analysis shows that the three corporate governance variables used and their 
interactions only affect financial distress by 3.8 percent. So that further research is recommended to use corporate 
governance mechanisms from the other side, such as the proportion of independent commissioners and management 
compensation. Third, the results of the analysis of the coefficient of determination show that 96.2 percent of the 
variance of financial distress is influenced by other factors outside the study. The high number of other factors outside 
of research that affect financial distress indicates the possibility of financial distress is also influenced by external 
factors. Therefore, further research is recommended to also examine the company's external factors, such as interest 
rates. 
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